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GLOBAL MARKETS: CURRENCY VALUATION AND
THE OUTLOOK FOR THE US DOLLAR
Dr.Michael J. Woolfolk*
INTRODUCTION
Since 2001, the US dollar has lost more than 40% of its value against
the Euro, 30% against the British Pound, and about 20% against the Japanese
Yen. In November 2000 the US dollar traded at 1.16 Euro and today it is trading
at 0.6582. As the US descends further and further into debt of several trillion
dollars, the value of the US dollar is expected to decline further. What are the
consequences of the declining dollar for US multinationals? Over the years,
especially during the past seven years, US companies have carefully and
successfully maneuvered their way through the volatile foreign exchange
market.
The declining dollar is not a new phenomenon. During the mid 1970's
because of elevated oil prices and the actions of Central banks that were torn
between dealing with the threat of inflation and the downward risks of growth,
the dollar faced similar pressures that it is facing now. One notable difference
between then and now is the impact of high oil prices on US inflation. During
the mid 1970's, heavy reliance on imported oil prompted a stronger pass
through of oil prices into both Consumer Price Index (CPI) as well as inflation
expectations. Today, the dependence on imported oil is materially less and the
US Federal Reserve believes that inflation and inflation expectations can remain
contained despite the recent rise in oil and commodity prices.
If true, the US is unlikely to succumb to stagflationary conditions as it
did in the 1970's. However, the USD is nonetheless expected to remain weak
for some time as both US growth and interest rates lag behind those in other
major economies. Accurately forecasting a turnaround in the USD has been
made more difficult by the spread of a popular market investment strategy
called the "carry trade."

*Dr. Michael J. Woolfolk is the Senior Currency Strategist for the New York Bank Mellon in New
York, New York.
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A STRATEGIC OPTION
United States' multinationals have many different options in dealing
with the declining dollar. Over the recent decline in the dollar, the most
consistently successful strategy in the currency markets has been the "Carry
Trade". A carry trade is "[a] strategy in which an investor sells a certain
currency with a relatively low interest rate and uses the funds to purchase a
different currency yielding a higher interest rate. A trader using this strategy
attempts to capture the difference between the rates - which can often be
substantial,depending on the amount of leverage the investor chooses to use."
There are three basic conditions required to make these trades
attractive:
" A sufficiently large interest rate differential must exist to make
the trade worthwhile
" A funding currency that is stable to weakening. For example, the
US dollar.
" A low volatility environment
Given that "carry trades" are run on an un-hedged basis from a
currency perspective, the funding currency must not only have materially lower
interest rates than the destination investment currency, but the funding currency
must remain weak. If not, the currency's performance could undermine and
even overwhelm the expected yield of the interest rate differential. For
example, if ovemight interest rates in the US were 2.0% and in Australia it was
7%, investors may wish to capture the 5% differential by borrowing US Dollars
(USD) and buying AU Dollars (AUD). If, however, the USD rose in value
against the AUD by more than 5% over this period, the investor would end up
with a net loss. Consequently, "carry trades" require low volatility market
conditions in which the funding currency (the USD in this instance) is expected
to remain weak.
By the summer of 2007, the carry trade was the market's primary
strategy. For example, the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) reported that
the Japanese Yen denominated lending in the first quarter of 2007 topped one
trillion US dollars. In late June, the net short Japanese Yen futures held by
speculative players had reached an all time high. The BIS reported that foreign
currency investments made by Japanese households increased on average by 1.2
trillion Japanese Yen per month in the first six months of 2007.
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UNDERLYING FORCES BEHIND THE SUCCESS OF THE "CARRY TRADE"
In order to determine what has been the most important driver for
alpha creation in foreign exchange, we need to understand the underlying forces
behind the success of the carry trade strategy. To understand this, requires an
approach that encompasses four key areas. These are:
" Historical perspective
* Cross border financial politics
* Central bank intervention
" Behavior of different investor groups
In addition to the above four areas, the success of the strategy is also
dependent on information. Specifically, information on how the asset markets
are interacting with the currency markets as well as drawing inferences as to
why it is happening.
Historical perspective
Although, no two periods of time are ever the same, however, there are
a number of similarities between the backdrops to the current decline in the
value of the dollar to the markets in the mid-to-latel970. Once again, we are
facing rising oil prices; people are acquiring more commodities such as gold
and other minerals resulting in high rates of growth among countries with vast
reserves of mineral deposits such as Australia, Canada, and Chile. The high
growth attained by these countries is reflected in the ever increasing US trade
deficit that last year topped $700 billion.
One key difference between the pressures on the US dollar in the late
1970's to the current situation is the impact of currency pegs. Countries have
taken measures to contain inflationary pressures even as cost of food and energy
has risen. For example, in the US, despite a 26% slide in the US dollar index
compared to a decade ago, the consumer price index over the last eight years
has remained the same. On the other hand, inflation in the gulf region has risen
from below 4% in 2005 to above 12% in 2007. Similarly, there are inflationary
pressures in China triggered by rising food prices and also because of the influx
of money from abroad.
Although the circumstances are different in each of the cases, one
common feature of all of these nations is that they either peg their currency to
the US dollar, track a basket of currencies in which US dollar seemingly plays a
significant role or actively manage their currency against the greenback. Rising
food prices and high currency prices are a common feature of these countries.
One suspects, that the currency policies of these countries are, effectively,
importing inflation from the G7 nations.
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Comparing the performance of gold during the mid 1970's (Graph -l)
and now shows some interesting similarities. Overlaying the performance of
gold during 2005 to the present suggests that we may not have seen the top yet.
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During 1976-78 (Graph -2), gold began to accelerate in price at an
accelerating pace as the USD continued to weaken. The question becomes,
whether USD weakness will drive gold and other commodity prices
significantly higher in the coming year?
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Cross border financial politics
Although the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) eased policy
aggressively through2001, by January of 2002 the US dollar stood at its
strongest levels since 1986. Everything changed after this and some of the
forces that affected this change are:
* International criticism of the Japanese Ministry of Finance's
campaign of verbal intervention (and occasional fiscal
intervention) and the Bank of Japan's policy of "quantitative
easing," whereby interest rate were left at effectively 0% but
more money was allowed to be borrowed at this rate.
" The US was not the only country to complain about the actions of
the Japanese Central Bankers, its Asian Neighbors too voiced
their strong disapproval of the Japanese policies, especially
China. The call by the Bank of China's Governor on the Japanese
to take measures directed at preventing the continued devaluation
of the Japanese Yen that was causing widespread currency
devaluations across many Asian countries.
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* The response from the Japanese Central Bank was more of an
admonition of its Asian counterparts, especially the weakness in
the Chinese Yuan rather than concrete actions to stabilize the
Yen.
While China, Japan, and the US were squabbling about who should
have the weakest currency, the Euro-zone was more concerned about the
persistent weakness of its own currency.
* In an effort to shore up the value of the Euro and in response to
the weakening of the dollar, some countries including China were
in favor of using the Euro as an alternate reserve currency.
The result of the cross border politicking was:
1) Contrary to expectations of the Chinese, the US Treasury, and the
US Congress, Japan seemed to be pursuing a policy of keeping
the Japanese Yen as weak as possible.
2) On the other hand, the Europeans were taking the decline of their
currency more seriously and were taking active steps to remedy
the problem by promoting the increased use of the Euro as a
reserve currency.
3) It appears that the Europeans got their wish and the Euro started
to gain against the Japanese Yen and the US dollar.
European officials have effectively got what they wanted far back in
2002, a time when the Euro (EUR) currency was quite weak. The EUR has
rallied against many major currencies including the USD (Graph - 3) based
upon relatively high interest rates and the promotion of the EUR as a reserve
currency.
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Graph - 3
The Rise of the Euro
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Central Bank behavior
According to IMF, at the start of 2002, total global foreign exchange
reserves stood at just over 2 trillion US dollars. Of this total amount, about 1.57
trillion reserves had actually been allocated with 71% being held in US dollars
and 19.7% in Euros. By the start of 2003, total reserves had grown by about 0.5
trillion US dollars. However, the US dollar now only represented 67% of the
foreign exchange reserves while the Euro represented 24.6%. By the second
quarter of 2007, just in five years, total foreign exchange reserves had more
than tripled to 5.7 trillion dollars while the share of the dollar has decreased to
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just 64.7% of known holdings. Meanwhile the Euros' share had risen to 25.5%.
All the available evidence indicates that the phenomenal growth in
foreign exchange reserves over the past five years has been accompanied by a
notable push to diversify away from US dollars into Euros. It seems clear that
foreign exchange managers took the European pleas at the end of 2001
seriously. Following is a partial list of the foreign exchange managers that have
expressed a preference for reducing their exposure to the US dollar over the past
two years:
1) United Arab Emirates - is looking to convert up to 10% of its
foreign exchange reserves from the US dollar to the Euro,
doubling its Euro holdings.
2) Qatar - two years ago, used to invest about 99% of its portfolio in
US dollars and now it is down to 40%. About 40% of the balance
of Qatar's foreign reserves, estimated to be 50 billion US dollars
is invested in the Euro and another 20% in other currencies
including the British Pound.
3) Sweden - The Riksbank has boosted its level of Euro holdings
from 37% to 50% meanwhile reducing the level of foreign
reserve holdings in the US dollars from 37% to 20%.
The list goes on. The other countries that have joined the exodus of
switching its foreign reserves from the US dollar to the Euro include Italy, New
Zealand, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, and Thailand. Therefore, it is not
surprising to see the appreciation of the Euro
IS THE CURRENT FOREIGN EXCHANGE STRATEGY REALLY CARRY
TRADE ACTIVITY?
Based on available data, it is not clear that some of the strategies
followed in the foreign exchange market are really carry trade. For example, the
one-year yield gaps between the South African Rand (ZAR), New Zealand
dollar and Australian dollar against the Japanese Yen are substantial - 10.44%,
7.99%, and 6.526% respectively. The same cannot be said for the Canadian
dollar and the Norwegian Kroner's interest rate advantage which are 3.9% and
4.72% respectively. It is clear that the yield pick up on the Kroner is noticeably
less than that available on the British pound at 5.03%, while the Canadian
dollar's one year yield is only just above that of the US dollar. In other words,
the second best performing currency over the period actually had the third
lowest yield of the group ahead of the US dollar and the Japanese Yen. Hence,
it appears that the driving force here is not simply yield. This added to the fact
that the rallies have also come at a time of the heightened volatility in financial
markets suggests that characterizing these rallies as being the product of carry
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trade activity might be overly simplistic.
INVESTOR APPETITE FOR UNDERLYING EQUITY MARKETS
Looking at the performances of the currencies mentioned here in terms
of what has happened in their underlying equity markets provides ambiguous
results. Although the NZD and AUD have put in healthy rallies so far (Graph 4 and 5), it's difficult to argue that the performance of the respective currencies
has been down to relative investor interest in local stock markets. Our own
cross border custodial flow data seems to confirm this. Although we have
registered healthy fresh inflows into South African equities, the same cannot
really be said for Australia, New Zealand, Norway or Canada, where the flows
have been modest at best.
Graph - 4
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Graph - 5
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A POSSIBLE EXPLANATION FOR HIGH FLYING GROUP OF CURRENCIES
There are two common elements to this high flying group of
currencies; the first is the continued strong inflationary stance of their respective
central banks. Australia, South Africa and Norway all still appear to be in
tightening mode while New Zealand and Canada both remain on inflation
watch. In contrast, despite the apparent neutral stance of the FOMC, US
markets still expect two further rate cuts by the middle of next year. This is also
consistent with British Pound's relative weakness, given that the market
continues to price in at least one rate cut by the end of June 2008. The second
and closely related common feature is that they are, in one form or another,
commodity currencies.
It appears that in the circumstances that we are in, may be managers
should stop thinking about the rally in Japanese Yen as being driven by "risk
seeking" carry trade activity and, instead, look at it as a flight to safe haven
currencies in the face of rising concerns about the threat of future inflation.
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CONCLUSION

Based on our analysis and reviewing the existing evidence, it seems
the most consistently successful trading strategy of the past five years has been
driven by inflationary concerns or rather, by concerns over certain currencies as
"stores of value", i.e., currencies that are traded around the clock, are
considered a hard currency and have a history of maintaining their value. A
similar argument can be made about what has driven the ongoing rally in gold
price. As the USD has declined, USD-denominated commodities such as oil
and gold have risen in value to maintain their value in foreign currency terms.
Similar arguments can also be made about the performance of the US
dollar in recent years. The greenback has tended to outperform when oil prices
have been their weakest and the Federal Reserve has been at its most hawkish.
Given what has been observed, the driving force behind some of the currency
concerns has been an aggressive and ongoing squabble between the US, China
and Japan over who should have the weakest currency. Although it would be
wrong to say that they have followed policies of "competitive devaluations," the
motivations were essentially the same.
In light of all these different scenarios and situations, it seems
reasonable to conclude that a combination of structural economics and politics
have proved the ultimate real driver of the most significant trends within the
currency markets over the past five years.
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